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One of the standard motifs of the pseudo-Freudian dismissal of Hegel is
to characterize his System as the highest and most over-blown expres-
sion of oral economy: is the Hegelian Idea not a voracious eater which
“swallows” every object it stumbles upon? As Hegel likes to point out,
however, we can only grasp the object if this object itself already “wants
to be with/by us.” The standard critical reading constructs the Hegelian
absolute Substance-Subject as thoroughly constipated - keeping in itself
the swallowed content. But what about the counter-movement, the
Hegelian shitting, excrementation? Is the subject of what Hegel calls “ab-
solute Knowing” not also a thoroughly emptied subject, a subject reduced
to the role of pure observer of the self-movement of the content itself? 
O ne of the standard motifs of the pseudo-Freudian dismissal ofHegel is to characterize his System as the highest and most over-blown expression of oral economy: is the Hegelian Idea not a vo-
racious eater which “swallows” every object it stumbles upon? No wonder
Hegel perceived himself as Christian: for him, the ritual eating of bread tran-
substantiated into Christ’s meat signals that the Christian subject can inte-
grate and digest without remainder God himself. Is, consequently, the
Hegelian conceiving/grasping not a sublimated version of digestion? So
when Hegel writes:
If the individual human being does something, achieves something,
attains a goal, this fact must be grounded in the way the thing itself,
in its concept, acts and behaves. If I eat an apple, I destroy its organ-
ic self-identity and assimilate it to myself. That I can do this entails
that the apple in itself, already, in advance, before I take hold of it, has
in its nature the determination of being subject to destruction, having
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in itself a homogeneity with my digestive organs such that I can make
it homogeneous with myself. (Lectures 127) 
is not what he offers here a lower version of the cognition process itself in
which, as Hegel likes to point out, we can only grasp the object if this ob-
ject itself already “wants to be with/by us”? One should carry this metaphor
to the end: the standard critical reading constructs the Hegelian absolute
Substance-Subject as thoroughly constipated - keeping in itself the swal-
lowed content. But what about the counter-movement, the Hegelian shitting,
excrementation? Is the subject of what Hegel calls “absolute Knowing” not
also a thoroughly emptied subject, a subject reduced to the role of pure ob-
server of the self-movement of the content itself? 
The richest is therefore the most concrete and most subjective, and
that which withdraws itself into the simplest depth is the mightiest
and most all-embracing. The highest, most concentrated point is the
pure personality which, solely through the absolute dialectic which
is its nature, no less embraces and holds everything within itself.
(Hegel’s Science of Logic 841)
In this strict sense the subject itself is the abrogated/cleansed substance, a
substance reduced to the void of the empty form of self-relating negativity,
emptied of all the wealth of “personality” - in Lacanese, the move from sub-
stance to subject is the one from S to $, i.e., subject is the barred substance.
(Adorno and Horkheimer, in The Dialectic of Enlightenment, make the crit-
ical point of how the Self bent on mere survival has to scarify all content
that would make survival worthy; this very move is what Hegel asserts.)
Schelling referred to this same move as contraction (again, with the excre-
mental connotation of squeezing the shit out of oneself, dropping it out): the
subject is the contracted substance.
Does then the final subjective position of the Hegelian System not com-
pel us to turn around the digestive metaphor? The supreme (and, for many,
the most problematic) case of this counter-movement occurs at the very end
of Logic, when, after the notional deployment is completed, reaching the
full circle of the absolute Idea, the Idea, in its resolve/decision, “freely re-
leases itself” (843) into Nature, lets Nature go, leaves it off, discards it,
pushes it away from itself, and thus liberates it.
The same move is accomplished by God himself who, in the guise of
Christ, this finite mortal, also “freely releases itself” into temporal exis-
tence. The same goes for early modern art, where this is how Hegel accounts
for the rise of “dead nature” (still life) paintings (not only landscapes, flow-
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ers, etc., but even pieces of food and dead animals): precisely because, in the
development of art, subjectivity no longer needs the visual medium as the
principal medium of its expression, i.e., because the accent shifted to poet-
ry as a more direct presentation of the subject’s inner life, the natural envi-
rons is “released” of the burden to express subjectivity and thus gains free-
dom, can be asserted on its own. And, furthermore, as some perspicuous
readers of Hegel have already pointed out, the very sublation of art itself in
philosophical sciences (in conceptual thought), the fact that art is no longer
obliged to serve as the principal medium of the expression of the spirit, frees
it, allows it to gain autonomy and stand on its own - is this not the very def-
inition of the birth of modern art proper, no longer subordinated to the task
of representing spiritual reality?
The way abrogation relates to sublation is not that of a simple succes-
sion or external opposition, not “first you eat, then you shit.” Shitting is the
immanent CONCLUSION of the entire process: without it, we would be deal-
ing with the “spurious infinity” of an endless process of sublation. The
process of sublation itself can only reach its end by the counter-move:
contrary to what one would initially imagine, these two processes of
sublation and abrogation are completely interdependent. Considering
the last moment of absolute spirit (Philosophy), one readily notes the
synonymy between the verbs aufheben and befreien (“to liberate”), as
well as ablegen (“to discard,” “to remove,” “to take away”). Specula-
tive abrogation, in no way alien to the process of Aufhebung, is indeed
its fulfillment. Abrogation is a sublation of sublation, the result of the
Aufhebung’s work on itself and, as such, its transformation. The
movement of suppression and preservation produces this transforma-
tion at a certain moment in history, the moment of Absolute Knowl-
edge. Speculative abrogation is the absolute sublation, if by “ab-
solute” we mean a relief or sublation that frees from a certain type of
attachment. (Malabou 156)
A true cognition is thus not only the notional “appropriation” of its ob-
ject: the process of appropriation goes on only as long as cognition remains
incomplete. The sign of its completion is that it liberates its object, lets it be,
drops it. This is why and how the movement of sublation has to culminate
in the self-relating gesture of sublating itself. So what about the obvious
counter-argument: is the part which is abrogated, released, not precisely the
arbitrary, passing, aspect of the object, that which the notional mediation/re-
duction can afford to drop as the part which is in itself worthless? This, pre-
cisely, is the illusion to be avoided, on two points. First, the released part is,
on the contrary, if one may be permitted to insist on the excremental
metaphorics, precisely (as discarded) the manure of the spiritual develop-
ment, the ground out of which further development will grow. The release
of Nature into its own thus lays the foundation of Spirit proper which can
develop itself only out of Nature, as its inherent self-sublation. Second (and
more fundamentally), what is released into its own being in speculative cog-
nition is ultimately the object of cognition itself which, when truly grasped
(begriffen), no longer has to rely on the subject’s active intervention, but de-
velops itself following its own conceptual automatism, with the subject re-
duced to a passive observer who, without its contribution (Zutun), lets the
thing deploy its potentials and merely registers the process. Which is why
the Hegelian cognition is simultaneously active and passive, but both in a
sense which radically displaces the Kantian notion of cognition as the unity
of activity and passivity. In Kant, the subject actively synthetizes (confers u-
nity on) the content (the sensuous multiplicity) by which he is passively af-
fected. For Hegel, on the contrary, at the level of Absolute Knowing, the
cognizing subject is thoroughly passivized: he no longer intervenes into the
object, but merely registers the immanent movement of the subject’s self-
differentiation/self-determination (or, to use a more contemporary term, the
object’s autopoetic self-organization). The subject is thus, at its most radi-
cal, not the agent of the process: the agent is the System (of knowledge) it-
self which “automatically” deploys itself, without any need for external
pushes or impetuses. However, this utter passivity simultaneously involves
the greatest activity: it takes the most strenuous effort for the subject to “e-
rase himself” in its particular content, as the agent intervening into the ob-
ject, and to expose oneself as a neutral medium, the site of the System’s self-
deployment. Hegel thereby overcomes the standard dualism between Sys-
tem and Freedom, between the Spinozist notion of a substantial deus sive
natura whose part I am, caught in its determinism, and the Fichtean notion
of the subject as the agent opposed to the inert stuff, trying to dominate and
appropriate it: the supreme moment of the subject’s freedom is to set free its
object, to leave it to freely deploy itself: “The Idea’s absolute freedom con-
sists in . . . that it resolves to freely let go out of itself the moment of its par-
ticularity” (Hegel, Encyclopaedic Knowledge par. 244). “Absolute freedom”
is here literally absolute in the etymological meaning of absolvere, releas-
ing, letting it go. Schelling was the first to criticize this move as illegitimate:
after Hegel completed the circle of logical self-development of the Notion,
being aware that all this development took place in the abstract medium of
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thought, outside real life, he had to somehow make the passage to real life -
however, there were no categories in his logic to accomplish this passage,
which is why he had to resort to terms like “decision” (the Idea “decides” to
release Nature from itself), which are not categories of logic, but of will and
practical, actual life. This critique clearly misses the way this act of releas-
ing the other is thoroughly immanent to the dialectical process, its conclu-
sive moment, the sign of the conclusion of a dialectical circle.
Which is how one should read Hegel’s “third syllogism of Philosophy,”
Spirit-Logic-Nature: the starting point of the speculative movement ren-
dered by this syllogism is spiritual substance into which subjects are im-
mersed; then, through strenuous conceptual work, the wealth of this sub-
stance is reduced to its underlying elementary logical/notional structure;
once this task is accomplished, the fully developed logical Idea can release
Nature out of itself.
So, to pursue the rather tasteless metaphor, Hegel was not a sublimated
shit-eater, as the usual notion of the dialectical process would lead us to be-
lieve. The matrix of the dialectical process is not that of excrementation-
externalization followed up by swallowing up (re-appropriation) of the exter-
nalized content, but, on the contrary, of appropriation followed up by the ex-
cremental move of dropping it, releasing it, letting it go. What this means is
that one should not equate externalization with alienation: the externaliza-
tion which concludes a cycle of dialectical process is not alienation, it is the
highest point of dis-alienation: one really reconciles oneself with some ob-
jective content not when one still has to strive to master and control it, but
when one can afford the supreme sovereign gesture of releasing this content
from oneself, of setting it free. Which is why, incidentally, as some perspi-
cacious interpreters have pointed out, far from subduing nature totally to
man, Hegel opens up an unexpected space for ecological awareness: for
Hegel, the drive to technologically exploit nature is still a mark of man’s
finitude; in such an attitude, nature is perceived as an external object, an
opposing force to be dominated, while a philosopher, from his standpoint of
Absolute Knowing, does not experience nature as a threatening foreign field
to be controlled and dominated, but as something to be left to follow its
inherent path. 
What this means is that the Hegelian Subject-Substance has nothing to
do with some kind of mega-Subject who controls the dialectical process,
pulling its strings: there is no one pulling the strings and controlling the
process - the Hegelian System is a plane without a pilot. Here Louis Althuss-
er was wrong when he opposed the Hegelian Subject-Substance, the “teleo-
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logical” process-with-a-subject, to the materialist-dialectical “process with-
out a subject.” Not only is the Hegelian dialectical process the most radical
version of a “process without a subject” in the sense of an agent controlling
and directing it, be it God or humanity or class as a collective subject - in
his late writings, Althusser seems to be aware of this. What Althusser is thor-
oughly unaware of is how the fact that the Hegelian dialectical process is a
“process without a subject” (in the sense of a controlling agent) means ex-
actly the same as Hegel’s fundamental thesis that “it is crucial to grasp the
Absolute not only as Substance, but also as Subject”: the emergence of a
pure subject qua void is strictly correlative to the notion of “System” as the
self-deployment of the object itself with no need for any subjective agent to
push it forward or to direct it.
So what critics of Hegel’s voracity need is, perhaps, a dose of a good
laxative. 
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